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1.1 Sensor Networks 
 
 
Sensor Networks are formed with a number of small low cost sensor devices 
which connect wirelessly to gather data. A sensor can obtain data from it’s 
surrounding and transmit to a central base station where it can be processed into 
meaningful information. Common applications include defense systems and 
environment monitoring. These use multi-hop routing similar to Ad-hoc wireless 
techniques, to communicate with one another which allows a certain degree of 
mobility and flexibility. They can be deployed in a number of ways with a multitude 
of configurations in large numbers, depending on the application they are intended 
for.      
Sensors used in the real world have a number of limitations in resources and 
capabilities. Research conducted in these areas aim at enhancing or improving on 
these limitations. Most of the work done is in improving the life of the power source 
available in the sensor which is limited with what’s available during deployment and 
improving aspects of the network and communication layers. The limited resources 








1.1.1 Energy and Power Consumption 
            Power consumption is a major focus for many applications as power is a very 
limited resource. Power supply for the sensors is through a battery source that is not 
replenished. Sensors rely on periods of inactivity to conserve and lower their power 
consumption. Data collection and computation is not done constantly but in periods of 
relevance. They do this in aggregation where only some nodes remain in the active 
state and some of them go into a passive mode to conserve power. The Tiny OS 
beaconing protocol is used to operate the sensors and nodes. A breath first spanning 
tree is constructed to map all the nodes in the vicinity and they are constantly updated 
with each hop [1]. 
Security is an important criterion after power. A secure network would work more 
reliably with minimal threats from intrusions [5]. Tradeoffs between power and 
security are usually the deciding factor in a successful sensor network deployment. 
Security may not be an important factor in a building structural change monitoring 
sensor where there is little or no threat but power consumption is an important factor. 
However in a battlefield where security plays an important role, the options are 
usually low computation intensive algorithms to protect inter node communication. 
Some of the more complex forms of encryption are not feasible because of the limited 
computation available and the possibility of breaking into a node which can be 
physically compromised. Some of the security related efforts are aimed at improving, 
routing protocols to protect sensors from malicious attacks and being energy efficient 
too. A lot of new research has proposed various security mechanisms for sensor 
networks. Various countermeasures in response to attacks have been proposed. 
However, as far as we are aware, no one has investigated the energy consumed in 
activating and executing these various countermeasures. If a countermeasure requires 
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large amounts of energy, it may not be economical.  On the other hand, there may be 
countermeasures for other attacks which may not require a lot of energy. Knowing the 
energy consumed in defending against attacks will help the sensor network designer 
in deciding which countermeasures should be encoded into a sensor.  As far as we are 
aware, this is the first work to measure the energy consumed in defending individual 
sensor nodes against different kinds of attacks.  The results from this work can be 
extrapolated to provide defense mechanisms for a whole sensor network.   
The thesis concentrates on documenting power drain in various attacks that 
occur on sensor networks in a real world scenario and to apply relative 
countermeasures to recover from these attacks. Power levels of the sensors are 
constantly monitored to determine the best solution. Some of the work performed on 
monitoring power levels are on simulators with communication rates and node duty 
cycles without considering the power consumed by devices on the sensors themselves. 
Some of the real world scenarios may usually reveal a lot more issues than a typical 
setup in a simulator. 
1.1.2  Sensor Overview 
A sensor network is a combination of the central data gathering unit called a 
base station and several sensors. The number usually ranges from 100~1000 units. 
Some of these sensors have a multitude of sensing capabilities like temperature, 
pressure, location (GPS), altitude, movement and light. The configuration and 
deployment preferences depend on the application at hand. The base station serves as 
the gateway to collect data from the nodes and channel it to the data processor. The 
base handled computation has better resources than the sensors themselves.  
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Nodes communicate in a multi hop approach. During an initial deployment 
phase the nodes are randomly deployed around a base station and a trust relationship 
is formed where all the nodes start communicating with the base station. Normal 
working period of a node is usually from 2-3 months with the battery pack normally 
equipped with the nodes.  
 
 
Typical Sensor node manufactured by Crossbow. 
Figure 1 
 
Although several sensors are available, in this thesis we work on the Mica 
Mote sensors. This sensor has good simulation support and is commonly used for 
research purposes.   
 
The processor used, is an Atmel 8bit CPU with a 4 MHz clock speed, 4 KB or 
RAM and 512 KB of cache memory8. The power consumption of the CPU is 5.5mA 
(3V) when active and half that amount when it is in the sleeping mode. The node is 
equipped with a radio beacon that has a range of around 250 – 300 meters [6].  
Crossbow manufactures the motes with various sensor setups. Research is ongoing to 
improve sensor capabilities and communication protocols. 





            Tiny OS is an operating system developed by Berkeley to operate the sensors. 
The TinyOS beacon protocol is used for communication for the sensors. A typical 
setup can have more than one base station and a node can be associated with more 
than one base station at a time.  Power management is a critical issue for sensor 
networks which depend on very limited power supply (two AA type batteries for the 
Mica Mote sensors). Prolonging the power is typically achieved by using energy 
efficient routing mechanisms. Sensors enter constant idle moments or sleep states to 
conserve power. Some event triggers the sensors out of sleep mode into active mode.  
In active mode each event or task requires precious power and drains the batteries.  
Besides energy conservation, the other major issue facing sensor networks in 
security from an adversary. Attacks can occur when the sensors least expect them and 
the applied countermeasure may require substantial power expenditure. In this thesis 
some of these attacks and countermeasure are studied with a provision to monitor the 
remaining power levels. Effects of various attacks reveal information about the 
outcome of these attacks and the success of these countermeasures.  
1.1.3  Security Issues 
Since the nodes in a sensor network lack capability and power capacity, 
communication typically takes place through an insecure channel with an emphasis on 
low power consumption and low radio communication. This makes it very susceptible 
to attacks. An adversary can take control of the sensors physically and snoop at the 
information available or modify certain parameters in the sensor to take control of the 
entire network. Alternately an attacker can override the built in security measures to 
cause inexplicable damage from which a network cannot recover. An attacker can 
also obtain information about the details of data capture and its contents, both of 
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which could prove damaging to the network. Some of the secure routing protocols 
like distance routing and source routing protocols used in Ad-Hoc networking are not 
suitable in sensor networks because of their incapability to sustain the overheads 
involved. Other secure protocols can be deployed but the trade-off might be to 
sacrifice either lifetime of a normal working sensor or some of its other capabilities. 
Some of the best solutions to secure routing are at the application layer where 
an adversary can be prevented by data checking and correction. Some of the attacks 
are described here with countermeasures.  
In Chapter 2 we review the various attacks on sensor networks and the 
corresponding countermeasures. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the methodology and 
implementation details. This includes the tools used to simulate our attacks and 
countermeasures. Chapter 5 provides the results of the experiments. The conclusions 






















Sensor routing protocols are primarily designed with energy efficiency and not 
security in mind. Consequently, they are susceptible to most of the attacks. The 
attacks can be classified into the following categories [1]. 
2.1.1  Spoofed, altered or replayed routing information 
An adversary can spoof, alter or replay routing information communicated to a 
target node to node communication. This form of attack is common as it does not take 
much to achieve; rather it involves intercepting information being exchanged between 
nodes and relaying them. A successful attack may involve creating routing loops, 
generate false error messages or partitioning the network into incompatible nodes or 
increase the end-to-end latency between nodes. 
2.1.2 Selective forwarding 
In selective forwarding the attacker needs complete access to the path of the 
data flow. An adversary can successfully jam or cause collision to the data thereby 
causing disruption to the data flow. Multi-hop networks are often based on the 
assumption that these participating nodes will faithfully forward messages received. 
Malicious nodes may refuse to forward certain messages and simply drop them, 
ensuring that they are not propagated any farther. A simple form of this attack is when 
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a malicious node behaves like a black hole and refuses to forward every packet she 
sees. However, such an attacker runs the risk of neighboring nodes determining that 
she has failed and deciding to seek another route. A more subtle form of this attack is 
when an adversary selectively forwards packets. An adversary interested in 
suppressing or modifying packets originating from a select few nodes can reliably 
forward the remaining traffic and limit suspicion of any wrongdoing. The other 
attacks where an attacker can include in the path of the data flow are Sybil attack and 
sinkhole attack. 
2.1.3 Sybil attacks 
A Sybil attack is created when a malicious node assumes the identity of 
another node on the network. A node illegally assumes multiple identities either 
forging an identity or stealing legal identities. A simple way to detect a Sybil attack is 
to verify the identity of each node and confirm its integrity [14]. Without a central 
system verifying the identities it becomes easy for a malicious node to infiltrate a 
network.  
 
2.1.4 Sinkhole attacks 
Sinkhole attacks are similar to selective forwarding, where a rogue node 
attracts all the traffic from neighboring networks depending on the routing algorithm. 
A metaphorical sinkhole is created with the adversary in the center luring all the 
application data towards it. Sinkhole attacks can also cause many other attacks like 




 Routing data away from the sink is possible by replaying an advertisement 
from a previously good quality link. Some protocols might actually contain reliability 
or latency information. An adversary with a palm pilot or a laptop which is much 
higher powered than a sensor sink can provide a higher link by transmitting enough 
power that the nodes might think that the base station can be reached in one hop 
thereby deceiving the others into thinking that they are nearer to the base station to 
which they need to report. This information is later propagated to its neighbors and 
traffic is eventually diverted. Effectively, the adversary creates a large “sphere of 
influence” [1], attracting all traffic destined for a base station from nodes several (or 
more) hops away from the compromised node. 
One motivation for mounting a sinkhole attack is that it makes selective 
forwarding trivial. By ensuring that all traffic in the targeted area flows through a 
compromised node, an adversary can selectively suppress or modify packets 
originating from any node in the area.  It should be noted that the reason sensor 
networks are particularly susceptible to sinkhole attacks is due to their specialized 
communication pattern. Since all packets share the same ultimate destination (in 
networks with only one base station), to influence a potentially large number of nodes 
a compromised node need only to provide a single high quality route to the base 
station. 
2.1.5 Wormhole Attack 
A Wormhole Attack is caused by an attacker who tunnels packets at one point 
to another point in the network, and then replays them into the network from that 
point. The wormhole attacks can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially 
against many routing protocols. The simplest instance of this attack is a single node 
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situated between two other nodes forwarding messages between the two of them. 
Since the tunneled distances are longer than the normal wireless transmission range of 
a single hop, the source will prefer the path including the attack nodes. Then the 
attack nodes may perform various attacks, such as the black hole attacks (by dropping 
all data packets) and grey hole attacks (by selectively dropping data packets). Because 
the wormhole nodes do not modify or fabricate packet, cryptographic techniques 
cannot detect this type of attack. It is a severe attack that is particularly challenging to 
defend against. Methods to defend a wormhole attack are by adding information about 
geography or time to a packet to restrict the packets maximum allowed transmission 
distance. 
In some cases, an adversary situated close to a base station may be able to 
disrupt routing completely by creating a well-placed wormhole. An adversary could 
convince nodes who would normally be multiple hops from a base station that they 
are only one or two hops away via the wormhole. This may create a sinkhole due to 
the potential attractiveness of the route created by the wormhole [1]. Those nodes 
neighboring the adversary on the other side of the wormhole may choose to forward 
packets destined for a base station through this route. The result would be to 
propagate knowledge of this route to their neighbors and attract more traffic.  
Wormholes become particularly difficult when combined with either a Sybil 
or a selective forwarding attack as they are similar and detection is extremely 
difficult. 
2.1.6 HELLO flood attack 
This is similar to the Sybil attack, except it takes advantage of a basic 
characteristic in the protocol. Many protocols require nodes to broadcast HELLO 
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packets to announce themselves to their neighbors, and a node receiving such a packet 
may assume that it is within range of the sender. Hence a laptop-class attacker with a 
powerful radio can send out a strong transmission to convince every node on the 
network that the adversary was the neighbor. In the preceding mayhem, every node 
will try to use this route, but those nodes sufficiently far away from the adversary 
would send packets into oblivion. The network is left in a state of confusion. A node 
realizing the link to the adversary is false could be left with few options: all its 
neighbors might be attempting to forward packets to the adversary as well [1]. 
Protocols which depend on localized information exchange between neighboring 
nodes for topology maintenance or flow control are also subjected to this attack. 
HELLO floods can also be thought of as one-way, broadcast wormholes.  
Even though this is a form of flood attack as seen earlier HELLO attack uses a 
single hop broadcast to transmit a message to many receivers to cause a state of 
confusion. 
2.1.7 Acknowledgement spoofing 
Spoofing is a form of deceiving a node into thinking what’s not true. For 
example a weak link may be portrayed as a strong one or a dead node is shown as a 
live node. Several sensor network routing algorithms rely on implicit or explicit link 
layer acknowledgements. Due to the inherent broadcast medium, an adversary can 
spoof link layer acknowledgments for overheard packets addressed to neighboring 
nodes. A routing protocol may select the next hop in a path using link reliably. 




Packets sent along those paths will not reach its destination and will inherently 
be lost, thus launching such an attack an adversary can cause enough data loss. Hence 





2.2.1 Spoofed and altered attacks. 
Since base stations are trustworthy, adversaries must not be able to spoof 
broadcast or flooded messages from any base station. This requires some level of 
asymmetry since every node in the network can potentially be compromised, no node 
should be able to spoof messages from a base station, and every node should be able 
to verify them [1]. Authenticating broadcast is also useful for localized node 
interactions. Using a global shared key reduces a number of attacks, such as by a 
simple link layer encryption and authentication with a global and shared key. Only 
nodes from the same group would have access to the global key and, hence message 
authentication can be performed by this method. Spoofing and altering packet 
information can be avoided. 
This prevents replay attacks and changing data packets. A counter is 
maintained to monitor each link and the next value of the counter is checked to see if 
messages are being replayed. The counter keeps track of identical messages received 
from each node. Each node simply remembers the most recently received counter 
value from each of its neighbors and discards packets containing older values. These 
mechanisms are enough to counter most of the discussed attacks when mounted by 
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outsiders. Most of selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks are not possible because 
the adversary is prevented from joining the topology. 
2.2.2 Selective forwarding 
Link layer security can provide some degree of security by validating some of 
the messages using authentication. A selective forwarding attack is followed by a 
malicious node not forwarding certain messages. The most vulnerable nodes are those 
that are near the base station. Multi path routing counters these types of selective 
forwarding attacks [1]. Messages routed over paths whose nodes are completely 
disjoint are protected against selective forwarding attacks involving at most 
compromised nodes and still offer some probabilistic protection when other nodes are 
compromised. However, completely disjoint paths may be difficult to create. 
Nevertheless link layer security is totally useless with other attacks like wormholes 
and Sybil attacks. 
2.2.3 The Sybil attack 
Several solutions have been proposed including symmetric key cryptography. 
Some of these forms require a lot of computation and processing power. With some 
authentication in the link layer a Sybil attack can be thwarted. A pair of neighboring 
nodes can use a shared key to implement an authenticated, encrypted link between 
them. However an adversary trying to infiltrate the network from inside cannot be 
stopped. To prevent an insider from wandering around a stationary network and 
establishing shared keys with every node in the network, the base station can 
reasonably limit the number of neighbors a node is allowed to have and send an error 
message when a node exceeds it. If a node is compromised the damage is limited to a 
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set of known neighbors [2]. In a link layer authentication mechanism the Sybil attack 
is no longer relevant because nodes are unwilling to accept even a single identity of 
the adversary. Even with a wormhole an artificial link can only create an unreliable 
path between two paths but the information cannot be compromised in this method. 
The damage is limited to low latency between the node and base station and not for 
the message loss themselves.  
When the network size is limited or the topology is well-structured or 
controlled, global knowledge can be leveraged in security mechanisms. In a relatively 
small network of around 100 nodes or less, it can be assumed that no nodes are 
compromised during deployment, then after the initial topology is formed, each node 
could send information such as neighboring nodes and its geographic location -if 
known back to a base station. Using this information, the base station can map the 
topology of the entire network. To account for topology changes due to radio 
interference or node failure, nodes would periodically update a base station with the 
appropriate information.  
2.2.4 HELLO flood attacks 
When compared to linked layer security mechanism, an authenticated code in 
the packet cannot stop a HELLO attack from distributing false node messages. It 
would up to a degree stop forwarding and replaying but has no effect on other type of 
attacks. 
Link layer security mechanisms using a globally shared key are completely 
ineffective in presence of insider attacks or compromised nodes. Insiders can attack 
the network by spoofing or injecting bogus routing information, creating sinkholes, 
using the Sybil attack, and broadcasting HELLO floods. An identity verification 
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protocol to verify the nodes identity to use a shared key would be more than sufficient 
in preventing a HELLO flood attack. The simplest defense against HELLO flood 
attacks is to verify the bi-directionality of a link before taking significant action based 
on a message received over that link. A base station limitation could also be used to 
limit the number of trusted nodes from exchanging information thereby preventing a 
large number of HELLO messages from interfering with its performance. This is also 




2.2.5 Sinkhole attacks 
A significant challenge in securing large sensor networks is their inherent self-
organizing, decentralized nature. Sinkholes are particularly vulnerable in protocols 
that use remaining energy or reliability information between nodes because this 
information is hard to verify from actual value. In a wormhole attack, the out-of-band 
channel not being available to the sensor network could compromise a network [18]. 
Routes that minimize the hop count to a base station are easier to verify, however 
hop-count can be completely misrepresented through a wormhole. When routes are 
established simply based on the reception of a packet as in TinyOS beaconing or 
directed diffusion, sinkholes are easy to create because there is no information to 
verify the validity of a sinkhole. Probabilistic selection of a next hop from several 
acceptable destinations or multi path routing to multiple base stations can help with 
this problem, but it is not perfect. When a node must route around a “hole”, an 
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adversary can “help” by appearing to be the only reasonable node to forward packets 
to [1]. 
The compromised node advertising its location on a path between the targeted 
node and a base station will guarantee it is the destination for all forwarded packets 
from that node. Sufficiently restricting the structure of the topology can eliminate the 
requirement for nodes to advertise their locations if all nodes’ locations are well 
known. For example, nodes can be arranged in a grid with square, triangular, or hex 
shaped cells. Every node can easily derive its neighbors’ locations from its own, and 




2.2.6 Wormhole countermeasures 
The most elaborate form of worm hole checking and countermeasures are to 
obtain a statistical analysis of routes obtain during route discovery and send an ACK 
on suspicious paths to check for a wormhole, but this method could be more processor 
intensive and also not power efficient requiring constant time synchronization.  
  The other possible method is to use geographic location models to 
document wormhole attacks. Since we know how data moves we can be sure when a 
suspicious route is created and data diverted. Artificial links are easily detected in 
geographic routing protocols because the “neighboring” nodes will notice the distance 
between them is well beyond normal radio range. Drastic or suspicious changes to the 
topology might indicate a node compromise, and the appropriate action can be taken 
.Wormhole is most effective when used to create sinkholes or artificial links that 
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attract traffic. Geographic routing can be effective in stopping many attacks but that 
location information is trusted. Apart from Geographic routing methods, directional 
antennas can also be used to prevent a wormhole attack. Nodes share directional 
information to avoid being compromised by false neighbors using endpoints [15]. 
Nodes with one hop accessibility maintain accurate information about their proximity 
locations and the direction other nodes are located. In this method, zones are created 
























3.1 Sensor attacks and their effects on power and performance 
 
With the increasing applications of sensors, it becomes more critical to protect 
sensor networks from malicious attacks.  As seen in the previous sections, potential 
attacks on sensor networks have been identified and furthermore, counter measures to 
these attacks have been proposed. However, there is no work reported in the literature 
on the impact of these attacks and counter measures with relation to energy and 
performance.  As energy is severely limited in sensor networks, the impact of these 
attacks on energy consumption is critical.  Furthermore, the energy consumed in 
protecting or defending these networks is also a critical factor, since high energy 
consumption approaches to protect sensor networks may not be a practical proposition 
[3]. The validity of the proposed counter measures is therefore in question until their 
energy consumption is determined.  
In this thesis we propose to measure the change in energy consumption on 
nodes due to malicious attacks as well as the energy overheads in defending against 
these attacks. Furthermore, we also propose to investigate the impact caused by these 
attacks and the subsequent overheads in the counter measures. 
In normal conditions the above mentioned sensors operate at full operating 
capability at 100% power load for a maximum of two weeks [4]. If an attack occurs 
and sensors are compromised the recovery could be expensive in terms of energy. 
This is important as the nodes cannot be replaced. Obtaining the energy and 
performance measures will be essential to determining the best solution for recovery 
and countermeasure.  
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 Given that counter measures consume energy, it may make sense not to 
commit a countermeasure and instead quarantine the affected sensors thus saving the 
current network from unsafe affected nodes and conserve power. Because of an attack 
some extra precautionary measures could be employed to avoid either spreading the 
same attack or containing it to certain areas. 
 Measurement of attack effects and the application of related counter effects 
can be documented over a period of time frame; this could give us an average 
working model of the sensors in real time. Sensor networks use Tiny OS which is an 
event driven operating system.  Because of its simplicity the network lacks the 
security required in an otherwise secure network. They are vulnerable to most of the 
attacks previously discussed. 
In this thesis we will model the following attacks and counter measures and 
document their power profiles. 
 
3.2 Simulation of Attacks and countermeasures 
 
HELLO flooding attack: 
Motes are configured with a program to listen and perform the initial HELLO 
handshake. A powerful base station with the capability to reach directly out to the 
nodes is deployed after the network is formed and repeated requests for neighbor 
information is requested from the motes, causing them to flood the networks with 
HELLO packets. 
Countermeasures are followed up immediately by resetting the motes to load 
the default program, thus dropping the flood packets. It will restrict the number of 
connections a base station or a mote can accept. A counter keeps track of the HELLO 
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packets received from and to the mote. After a few minutes of restricted operation a 
counter relax that allows more connection between motes and return to normal 
operating conditions. Replay attacks can also be avoided with this mechanism. 
 
A typical Operational Hierarchy: 
• Deploy motes with the basic network program loaded in them connected to 
base station A 
• Deploy another adversary base station B which is more powerful than 
most of the other motes in the network to simulate a HELLO attack. 
• Attack becomes evident and data is logged to document effects when the 
counter shows increased network activity. 
• Countermeasure is to load a modified program which would limit 
incoming and outgoing connections on motes and base station. 
• Counter deployed to keep track of messages received 
 






Sybil Attacks can be simulated by deploying an adversary node on a network 
which assumes one of an existing mote’s identities. Attack detection is assumed when 
packets are seen dropping at the base station when the adversary node is started [17]. 
Countermeasure to a Sybil attack is to check the number of connections made 
by the base station at any given time and compare with the node ID which forms part 
of the header data transmitted by the nodes. Neighbors ID’s can be logged and 
compared to find cloned node connections. Such comparisons and computations are 




Figure 3.2: Sybil Attacks 
 
 
Selective forwarding attacks: 
In selective forwarding attacks nodes that appear near the base station are 
targeted which are assumed to have a lot of data due to their proximity to the base 
station. 
Countermeasure: In an attack, nodes which are assumed to be affected are 
made to use a multi-path routing approach to the base station to deliver packets. In our 
example nodes A to D represent those that lie close to the base station and vulnerable 
to a selective forwarding attack. If node D is compromised packets coming to the base 
station are sent in a multi path route through nodes A through C. Any discrepancy can 
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be detected by comparing packet count received from A, B and C with that of D. This 
would confirm a selective forwarding attack. 
   























4.1 Simulation and Environment setup 
 
A typical setup for the experiment would involve around 8-9 motes, devices 
which form the sensor component and a radio component with a battery. They are 
deployed over a wide area where they form a multi hop connection with one another 
and eventually connect to a base station. The number of base stations in our 
experiment is assumed to be one. The motes are separated a distance 10-15 feet and 
spread wide apart so that they do not connect directly to the base station like an access 
point in an ad-hoc network. The most commonly used motes for research purposes is 
called Mica2 and manufactured by a company called Crossbow. A computer loaded 
with Tiny OS and a suite of test programs to measure throughput and power 
consumption is configured. The base station is connected to this computer to enable 
data transfers between the motes and the computer.  
                   Motes have limited memory capacity and computational power, 
with the capability to execute one application at a time. Surge-view is a program 
written by Crossbow the manufacturer of these motes, to help in forming a very basic 
topology connecting all motes in the network.  Once the network is formed using 
Surge-View, the test program we developed to simulate an attack and counter measure 
are loaded into the motes. The programs are loaded and run to obtain performance 
measures.  
 Each experiment is carried out for 10 minutes, to enable the network to 
configure properly and give a consistent output. Sometimes readings that are taken 
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within a short starting time tend to be skewed. On the real motes we need to wire 
extensive measuring instruments like a multi meter to each mote, so that power 
consumption changes can be gathered in real time. However, before the motes are 
used for the actual experiment, we develop our programs on a simulator like POWER-
TOSSIM or Avrora because of the flexibility achieved in the development process. 
The programs hence developed using the simulator is compatible with any mote 
without any modification. . Hence these programs can be loaded into the motes 
without any modifications and executed. A simulator like Avrora helps us in 
calculating power readings without using multi meters to measure power 
consumption. 
Tools to be used in performing our simulation:  
 
• Tiny OS Operating system developed by UC, Berkeley 
• Programs developed in nesC which is an embedded system development 
environment. 
• Data Logging application to gather our data, built on Tiny OS. 
• AEON (Accurate Prediction of Power Consumption) Plug-in to Model power 
consumption. AEON is integrated with AVRORA – A simulation and 
Analysis Framework tool. 
Methods to measure or document power consumption – On a real network the 
following are needed: 
 
• Multi-meter reading at constant intervals. 
• Surge view and Oscilloscope program developed by Crossbow. 






4.2 Network composition  
 













Figure 4.1: Network composition 
In all the experiments is with 8-9 Motes running the surge program and one 
malicious mote representing the attacker. 
Normal motes 
- All normal motes run a program named “SpoofSurge”.  The surge application 
is a simple multi-hop application. It takes light sensor readings from the motes 
and sends the data to the base station. 
Malicious mote 
- For Example: Runs a program named “SpoofReplay”, which is a modified 
version of Surge-View program to simulate a Spoof Attack. 
Base station 
- Also runs SpoofSurge application. The address of the base station is 0. It 
receives messages and forwards them through a UART. This node is connected 













The Attacks are simulated separately with normal versions of the programs 
running on some motes, and the countermeasure programs are tested with the Attack 
programs.  Several configurations are explored in the experiments. These included 
choosing parameters such as percentage of attack and the ratio of normal motes to 
countermeasure and attack motes.  
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
 
Throughput of data packets between the base station and the motes is logged 
in our data logging application. Other important indicators of network performance 
like routing overhead and Average End-to-end delay are also calculated. 
Measurement conditions and required observations: 
- Before an Attack under normal operating conditions. 
- During an Attack.(Measure data loss) 
- After an Attack (Measure power levels and mote states) 
- During counter measure implementations (Power levels) 
- After Counter measures are successfully implemented – current state 
of the network. 
Values are charted on a graph where the data could help us determine 
overheads especially when counter measures are applied. These results would indicate 
performance degradation in terms of data loss and slow transmission rates. Thus the 
tradeoffs using a particular approach could be documented.  
Power consumption of a sensor node is the important performance 
characteristics of interest. Considering that the power supply is at a constant voltage 
throughout the operation (3V), the power consumed is proportional to the leaked 
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current [7]. We can therefore compare power consumption of the sensors before, and 
after an attack, and the power consumed when deploying countermeasures.  Because 
power levels in a sensor could indicate the remaining life of a sensor, it should be 
constantly monitored.  
           Under normal operating conditions transmitting consumes more power 
than receiving. A special power down mode is even thriftier in saving power than the 
idle state of a sensor.  
State 
 
Leaked current (mA) 
Reception 12 ~ 16 
Transmission 14~18 
Idle (radio rx mode) 11 ~ 15 
Idle ( radio tx mode) 13-15 
Idle (radio off) 8 – 8 
Idle ( power down) 0.0 ~ 0.1 
 
Table 3.1: Power consumption in different operating modes (crossbow) 
Power supply voltage remains in a constant flux. Voltage has a linear effect on 
current and a quadratic effect on power and energy. Voltage fluctuations can lead to 
constant changes in energy use. Hence measuring voltage alone does not give us a 
clear idea of a sensors power consumption level. 
4.4 Network communication on TinyOS 
 
TinyOS (TOS) is the preferred operating system for wireless embedded sensor 
networks. The Open source community maintained it with some active participation 




It supports a wide range of sensors with drivers, data acquisition tools and 
programs necessary to run them. The time and effort required to develop in this 
environment is very minimal due to its component-based architecture [7]. TOS uses 
active message (AM Model) as defined in $TOS/system/types/AM.h to communicate. 
Message is “active” when it contains destination address, group id, and type. 
TinyOS has NesC as the programming language, and most of the programs are 























Figure 4.2: TOS communication architecture [16] 
We provide an example of the active messaging standard. Components are wired 
together by connecting users with providers, which forms a hierarchy.  In the example 

















upward to the AM handler from the radio stack. The TOS Thread model is classified 
into Tasks and Events. Tasks being time flexible and support longer background 
processing jobs and events are time critical and of shorter durations. As of with Tiny 
OS version 1.1 the number of concurrent tasks supported are 7. 
 
4.6 TOS communication paradigm 
    
The Network is modeled as a pipeline with minimal buffering for messages to get the 
maximum efficiency [9]. 
 
Send message 
To send a message a buffer needs to be filled with data, and the address of the 
recipients to whom it has to be sent. This Information is passed onto the operating 
system where it is used by the applications. It is also determined whether this 
information can be reused again. 
Receive message 
Incoming message would fill a buffer and the application is notified of the 
new message’s arrival. The application fetches the data from the buffer. The memory 
management for this operation is dynamic, and the buffer is cleared automatically for 
the next message to be received. 
 
   




A multi-hoping algorithm is used to route messages in the network. An Active 
Message is an alternative method to handle network messaging in Tiny OS instead of 





Figure 4.3: Message forwarding multi-hop protocol 
 
Route discovery is done by shortest path from every node to the base station. 
The base station broadcasts its identity from time to time. A table is maintained with 
their hop counts from the base station. A parent node is determined by the closest 
node discovered during this phase. Node A sends an AM (Active Message) packet to 
node B, B being the parent on the list for node A. When B receives the data packet 
successfully it will read the destination address to see if this message is for itself. If 
the destination is not B, then B will forward it to a parent node on the routing table. 
Suppose nodes C, D and E are “neighbors” of node B. Now B forwards the 
packet to its “parent” which is the node most likely on its list to receive data. In this 
case, E is B’s parent.  
B will update its neighbor list periodically by the hop count returned from 
other nodes, When E stops responding to B, E is determined not to be a reliable node 
to receive data and act as a “parent”, hence another node is selected to be the new 
parent of B which can be C or D, depending on their proximity to Node B.  Nodes 
look for parents with minimum hop count from the base station. This process is done 










Data packet format 
 
 
    
  Data structure definition 
           TOS uses active messages as defined in AM.h header. Message is 
active because it contains a destination address, groupID and type [16]. A message 
consists of the Header with handler name and data payload as argument. The 
following excerpts of a typical program explain the part involved in managing Radio 
communication. This allows the user to control the radio strength, acknowledgment 
















Header (5bytes) Payload (max 29bytes) CRC (2 bytes)
typedef struct TOS_Msg 
{ 
  /* The following fields are transmitted/received on the radio. */ 
  uint16_t addr; 
  uint8_t type; 
  uint8_t group; 
  uint8_t length; 
  int8_t data[TOSH_DATA_LENGTH]; 
  uint16_t crc; 
 
  /* The following fields are not actually transmitted or received  
   * on the radio! They are used for internal accounting only. 
   * The reason they are in this structure is that the AM interface 
   * requires them to be part of the TOS_Msg that is passed to 
   * send/receive operations. 
   */ 
  uint16_t strength; 
  uint8_t ack; 
  uint16_t time; 
  uint8_t sendSecurityMode; 





4.8 Using Avrora simulator and AEON plugin 
 
Compared to Power-Tossim and the Emstar simulators, Avrora has the ability 
to measure power consumption as well as simulating a sensor network at the same 
time. TOSSIM is a single application simulator and cannot simulate a collection of 
nodes on a network. For example when a single application like “surge” is run, 
TOSSIM will spawn 10 separate threads to run the program on 10 nodes. On Avrora 
with AEON, the results returned are accurate to the component level. 
4.8.1 Step 0 – Download Avrora 
Avrora is available from UCLA’s website. It is a simulation program written 
mainly for the AVR and mica2 platforms. [12]. 
4.8.2  Step 1 – Install java 
Avrora is written in java (platform independent). Pre-requisite is to install java 
SDK. (Used Java Version j2sdk1.4.2) 
4.8.3 Step 2 – Compile the TinyOS program 
The Avrora only supports mica2 platform. Since a binary image composed of 
ELF and SREC files cannot be directly loaded into Avrora, it is converted into a 





$ cd  $TINYOS_ROOT/apps/SpoofSurge 
 
$ make mica2 
 
mkdir -p build/mica2 
    compiling SpoofSurge to a mica2 binary 
ncc -o build/mica2/main.exe -Os -board=micasb -target=mica2 -I%T/lib/Queue -I%T/ 
lib/Broadcast -Wall -Wshadow -DDEF_TOS_AM_GROUP=0x7d -Wnesc-all -finline-limit=1 
00000 -fnesc-cfile=build/mica2/app.c  SpoofSurge.nc -lm 
RouterLEPSM.nc:633:2: warning: no newline at end of file 
C:/cygwin/opt/tinyos-1.x/tos/system/RealMain.nc: In function `main': 
C:/cygwin/opt/tinyos-1.x/tos/interfaces/StdControl.nc:63: warning: `result' migh 
t be used uninitialized in this function 
    compiled SpoofSurge to build/mica2/main.exe 









4.8.4 Step 3 – Disassemble the program 
 After obtaining the main exe file, the “avr-objdump” tool is used to disable 
textual format file. 
 
   
Note that the extension of the output file must be “.od”. 
We can obtain SpoofReplay.od in the same way. (Before compile, set 
TIMER_RATE=100) 
4.8.5 Step 4 – Run programs 
 Now we have the programs which can be read by Avrora. The .od extension 





Options used with avrora program and their explanations: 
-platform=mica2: 
$  avr-objdump –zhD ./build/mica2/main.exe > SpoofSurge.od 
$  java -jar avrora-beta-1.6.0.jar -platform=mica2 -seconds=600 -colors=false -report-seconds -




Now Avrora only supports mica2 platform. 
-seconds=600: 
Let all nodes run for 10 minutes. 
-colors=false: 
Do not display color on terminal. 
-report-seconds: 
Display event time in second instead of CPU cycle. 
-monitors=energy-log: 
Monitor power consumption and output log file for each node. 
–action=simulate: 
Indicate action type. 
-simulation=sensor-network: 
Simulate multi nodes. 
-nodecount=9, 1: 
“9, 1” is a node list. That means the first 9 nodes (node 0 to node 8) run the 
first program, and 1 node (node 9) runs the second program. 
    SpoofSurge.od SpoofReplay.od 
In our example the programs we want to run - 9 nodes run SpoofSurge.od 
(Normal) and 1 node runs SpoofReplay.od (Attack).     SpoofSurge and SpoofReplay 
are examples of the Spoof Attack. 
4.8.6 Step 5 – Collect power consumption data 
The final step is to collect the data. The data obtained from a real network is 
usually light and temperature readings of the sensors.The data from these sensors are 
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transmitted every 50 Seconds to the base station. On the simulator we get similar 
readings with LED indicators. 
 Power consumption contains several aspects: CPU, led, radio, sensor board 
and flash. Power consumption levels for each node is recorded and calculated in the 
analysis. Sample output (Avrora with AEON): 
 
Power comparisons in the simulator are calculated with two factors. 
After an Attack: 
- Power consumption 1 = After an Attack – Before an attack 
                                       ------------------------------------------            …. (4.1) 
Before an Attack 
After Countermeasures: 
- Power consumption 2 = After countermeasures – Before an Attack 
                                       ----------------------------------------------------- …. (4.2) 
Before an Attack 
 
 
Energy Consumption Component Breakdown: 
 
Node lifetime: 4423680000 cycles, 600.0 seconds 
 
CPU: 6.519386674160156 Joule 
   Active: 0.8983985768261719 Joule, 291792240 cycles 
   Idle: 5.620988097333984 Joule, 4131887760 cycles 
   RESERVED 1: 0.0 Joule, 0 cycles 
   ADC Noise Reduction: 0.0 Joule, 0 cycles 
   RESERVED 2: 0.0 Joule, 0 cycles 
   Power Down: 0.0 Joule, 0 cycles 
   Standby: 0.0 Joule, 0 cycles 
   Power Save: 0.0 Joule, 0 cycles 
   Extended Standby: 0.0 Joule, 0 cycles 
~~~~~~~~~ 
Radio: 17.86987400952148 Joule 
   Power Off: 0.0 Joule, 3140 cycles 
   Crystal: 3.2385253906249998E-6 Joule, 132650 cycles 
   Crystal + Bias: 1.7126464843749999E-6 Joule, 3050 cycles 
   Receive (Rx): 13.765509851562499 Joule, 3523970522 cycles 
   Transmit (Tx):        0: 0.058114546875 Joule, 22670208 cycles 
   Transmit (Tx):        15: 4.046244659912109 Joule, 876900430 cycles 
~~~~~~~~~ 
Sensor Board: 1.26 Joule 
   on:  : 1.26 Joule, 4423680000 cycles 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
flash: 0.0036 Joule 
   standby: 0.0036 Joule, 4423680000 cycles 
   read: 0.0 Joule, 0 cycles 
   write: 0.0 Joule, 0 cycles 










Figure 4.3 Timeline of readings taken 
The figure indicates the various points at which we obtain our measurements, 
with key phase Before, After and During referring to Before Attacks, After Attacks 
and During Countermeasures. ‘After’ attack refers to the time period when the node is 
under attack without any countermeasures.  
4.9.1 Types of Simulations  
Two sets of simulations were performed. In the first set, 9 nodes were ‘good’ with 1 
malicious node. In the second set, we used a proportion of malicious nodes in the 
network, which ranged from 10 – 90%. In our second set of simulations we varied the 
number of malicious nodes. In the graphs below 10% in attacks means that 1 of the 
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node is malicious from a total of 10 nodes. Therefore 90% in attacks means that 9 of 
the nodes are malicious and 1 node is good. 
In the case of Countermeasures, 90% where nodes that are defending, the ratio 
was split up to 9 ‘countermeasure’ and 1 malicious node. This was done to get some 
node to provide attack data on the network. 
  
4.9.2 Normal Operation 
    “Surge View” is the program that executes in the normal operational mode when 
the node is good; it uses the multi hop network protocol described above. This 
program is designed and implemented by Crossbow. A node waits for a packet from 
other nodes on the network and when it receives a packet, it checks the destination 
address to determine if that packet is addressed to itself. If it is not, then the packet is 
forwarded to the next node on the network. The next node is determined by the 
neighbor list for multi-hop routing as described in Section 4.9. The output LED 
indicates the status of the message. The three states are Green On for Sending a 
message, Green Off for Send done and Yellow Toggle On and Off for a new message 
arrival.  
High Level Pseudo Code for Surge View (Normal Program): 
 
 
Surge Normal Operation 
 
 Initialize: Comm,TimerC,LEdC,RandomLFSR( Randomizer) 
 Get Communication and timer Parameters 
 
 Make a neighbor list from nearby motes 
  
 Input: Get message from any mote 
 Compute: Make copy of the message 
 Output: Retransmit to the next node on the neighbor list 
 
 Show output on Led: Green On -Sending Message; Green off - Send done. ;  
                                   Yellow Toggle- new message obtained. 




The above Pseudo code describes the normal operation of a Surge program; it consists 
of input, output and Compute stages. The first step would be to initialize the various 
service components; Comm for Communication, this module would be to determine 
which network interface is the standard communication medium. TimerC keeps track 
of timer functions and provides clock counts, LedC has information about the LEDs 
used on the device and RandomLFSR provides a random number generation 
capability. The service modules are ‘wired’ together in a typical program. 
4.9.3 Simulation Environment / Details  
The simulations using Avrora involved 10 nodes, Avrora has the ability to specify 
which node runs the ‘Other’ program. The nodes being run on the simulator cannot be 
placed in specific proximity to the others, i.e. their location cannot be specified. 
However Avrora assumes a random distance from the base station providing a truly 
multi-hop capability to the network. Avrora uses a free space radio propagation 
model, where the default distance is 10 meters between motes and a random distance 
from the base station. The Free space radio propagation model is used in Avrora to 
determine the signal strength using the distance between nodes; noise and power 
transmission strength is also calculated in this way for each node. Although the user 
can change the distance factor between nodes, the user has no control over the overall 
area to accommodate the entire node collection. 
 To simulate the experiment in a real world, would involve deploying 10 motes 
in a small area and making sure that they are spread out to create a multi-hop network. 
The programs from these experiments can be directly loaded into the nodes. The data 
from the base station can be logged in a file and a multi meter can be hooked to each 











5.1 Spoofed attack and countermeasure 
 
Action and result 
Attack 
- Action: Replay the same data we receive from the other motes and re-transmit 
it to other neighbors. 
- Result: Increases network traffic and power consumption. 
Countermeasure 
- Action: Keep tracking messages that sent by other motes. Find out if the 
received message is old or duplicated by comparing the count we maintain in 
the program. 
- Result: Do not forward duplicated messages and discard them. 
5.1.1 Network composition 
Same as the Network composition in Figure 4.1 
5.1.2 SpoofReplay attack details 
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When SpoofReplay receives data message from a neighbor mote by radio, it 
will duplicate many copies and send them out to the base station and the other motes 
in its vicinity. The action is: 
Receive message -> Duplicate message -> Send out message 
    If that malicious mote received a new message, but has not finished sending 
out copies of the old message, it will do nothing on this new message. Messages are 
sent out repeatedly until the entire network is flooded. The received message is, AM 




















































MAC layer header Payload (max 29bytes) 
SpoofReplay Attack 
 
Initialize: Comm,TimerC,LEdC,RandomLFSR( Randomizer) 
Get Communication and timer Parameters 
 
Make a neighbor list from nearby motes 
 
Input: Get message from any mote 
Compute: Make duplicates of the message 
Output: Retransmit to random motes for 100 times - Once every second. 
 
Show output on Led: Green On -Sending Message; Green off - Send done. ; 




SpoofSurge is an application that uses multi-hop routing. Each Surge node 
takes light readings and forwards them to a base station. The node can also respond to 
broadcast commands from the base. To avoid replayed messages attack, a counting 
and tracking system is implemented. 
High Level Pseudo Code for Spoof Attack Countermeasure: 
 
 
 Replayed message tracking 
Suppose node A is a malicious node. When A receives a message from another 
node, it duplicates that message and sends as many copies to its parent node B. 
Because B holds information of A, it will find out if this message is duplicated 




 Initialize: Comm,TimerC,LEdC 
 Get Communication and timer Parameters 
 
 Input: when a message is received from a mote 
 Compute: Check for last sequence Number associated with the packet 
         If sequence number is not bigger than the last one received - do not forward message 
         If sequence number is bigger - forward to the next node on Neighbor list. 
 
 Show output on Led’s: 
    Red toggle:    send message error; 
    Green on:      sending message; 







If seqno in received message is not bigger than last_seqno, then node B 
believes the message is duplicated and will not pass the message to the next node. 
5.1.4 Simulation/Power Analysis - Spoofed attack and countermeasure 
5.1.4.1 Before attack 
    First we just let 9 nodes run SpoofSurgeNoCounter.od (Normal program) 
and do not inject any malicious nodes. Following is the value of power consumption 
on node 0, 4, 8. (Run time 10 minutes) shown below in Joules. These are default 
readings for all normal operation on the network.  
Node CPU Led Radio Sensor Board Flash Total 
0 6.432 0.013 17.283 1.26 0.004 24.992 
4 6.416 0.291 17.315 1.26 0.004 25.286 
8 6.416 0.286 17.315 1.26 0.004 25.281 
 
Table 5.1: Typical Power consumption with Surge – Normal Operation 
 
/* Fields of neighbor table */ 
typedef struct TOS_MHopNeighbor { 
  uint16_t addr;                          // state provided by nbr 
  uint16_t recv_count;                // since last goodness update 
  uint16_t fail_count;                 // since last goodness, adjusted by TOs 
  int16_t last_seqno; 
  uint8_t goodness; 
  uint8_t hopcount; 
  uint8_t timeouts;          // since last recv 
} TOS_MHopNeighbor; 
 
typedef struct MultihopMsg { 
  uint16_t sourceaddr; 
  uint16_t originaddr; 
  int16_t seqno; 
  uint8_t hopcount; 
  uint8_t data[(TOSH_DATA_LENGTH - 7)];  




Note:  Radio power consumption is normally higher than the CPU because of the 
main communication medium being wireless. 
5.1.4.2  After attack 
We next inject the malicious node (node 9), which is running the SpoofReplay 
(Attack) program. The power consumed after the attack is over is shown below.  
Node CPU Led Radio Sensor 
Board 
Flash Total 
0 6.482 0.019 17.283 1.26 0.004 25.048 
4 6.450 0.324 17.322 1.26 0.004 25.36 
8 6.452 0.344 17.331 1.26 0.004 25.391 
9 6.514 4.490 17.812 1.26 0.004 30.08 
 
Table 5.1.1: Spoof Attack Power consumption (10 Minutes | Unit in Joules) 
5.1.4.3 During counter 
         Change SpoofSurgeNoCounter.od (Normal) to SpoofSurge.od 
(Countermeasure),   and run again. 
Node CPU Led Radio Sensor 
Board 
Flash Total 
0 6.462 0.016 17.283 1.26 0.004 25.025 
4 6.445 0.345 17.316 1.26 0.004 25.37 
8 6.444 0.337 17.315 1.26 0.004 25.36 
9 6.51 4.408 17.813 1.26 0.004 29.995 
 
Table 5.1.2: Spoof Countermeasure Power consumption (10 Minutes | Unit in Joules) 
 
 

























5.1.4.4 Radio power consumption comparison 
Here we can compare radio power consumption before attack, after attack and 
during countermeasure: (unit is in Joule). 
Node Before After During 
0 17.28294837495117 17.28294837495117 17.28294837495117 
1 17.31497163474121 17.328573483569336 17.32782377536621 
2 17.31497163474121 17.33232202458496 17.326003055444335 
3 17.31497163474121 17.33939070192871 17.316042646459955 
4 17.31497163474121 17.322147413964842 17.31572134223633 
5 17.31497163474121 17.32525552224121 17.31497163474121 
6 17.31497163474121 17.328573483569336 17.317541992773435 
7 17.31668525349121 17.32664566247558 17.320540895678707 
8 17.314973809741208 17.331251082958982 17.31497163474121 
9  17.811831745922852 
(do not include) 
17.81333011376953 (do 
not include) 
Total 155.804437246630848 155.917107750244126 155.836565352392562 
 
Table 5.1.3: Spoof Attack Average Radio Power consumption 
From section 4.6.8 
 
Power increase rate 1 = (After – Before)/before = 0.000723153368443069894 





















Figure 5.4: Spoof Radio Power Consumption 
Spikes are noticed in the Attack data indicated as ‘Attack’ in the chart because 
of the increased radio operation to transmit/receive data between the motes during 
spoof replay. Node 0 with no power level change is the Base Station, which is not 
affected by spoof attacks. In the graph in fig 5.4 9 nodes are in normal mode with one 






















Figure 5.5: Spoof Radio Power Consumption – Overall 
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Figure 5.7: Spoof Countermeasure Radio Power Consumption  
In the graph in fig 5.6, spoof attack shows 90% (9 bad nodes) of the nodes in 
the network providing attack data and 10% running the normal version of Surge at the 
first instance. Similarly in fig 5.7 we have 10% (1 counter node) providing 
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countermeasure with the remainder configured to provide attack data. The maximum 
impact is noticed at 70:30(Attack: Counter) configurations which are 7 nodes 
providing attack data and 3 nodes defending by providing countermeasure, this could 
be because of a large number of normal modes being compromised and influenced by 
the spoof attack. 
Countermeasures are effective as their numbers increase from 70:30 (7 counter 
and 3 bad nodes) to 10:90 (1 counter and 9 bad node) where power consumption level 
can be seen going down.  
 
5.1.4.5  CPU power consumption comparison 
Node Before After During 
0 6.433002153463135 6.481989058326172 6.4620128746928716 
1 6.416962906932617 6.451140489597656 6.447122198427491 
2 6.416563857842529 6.452043172607422 6.446680593976806 
3 6.416787227515625 6.453460800742431 6.44511507122754 
4 6.416692427858399 6.449759634051026 6.444794257116699 
5 6.416900482207275 6.450354235359863 6.444584724852783 
6 6.4168850328396 6.45118967839087 6.445155471581788 
7 6.420200987850098 6.450451128157226 6.4454439623159185 
8 6.416699559657715 6.451737467600097 6.444475981239014 
9  6.513512369165772 
(do not include) 
6.510362461346924 
(do not include) 
Total 57.770694636166993 58.09212566483276 58.02538513543091 
Table 5.1.4: Spoof Attack Average CPU Power consumption 
 
From section 4.6.8 
Power increase rate 1 = (After – Before)/before = 0.005563911437972221541 




















Figure 5.8: Spoof CPU Power Consumption 
Node 0 is the base station; increased power consumption is a result of it 
receiving most of the messages from the malicious node. Most replayed messages are 
sent to the base station. Notice the increase in power surge after attack. In 
countermeasure the duplicate messages are eliminated and an attack is thwarted thus 


















Figure 5.9: Spoof CPU Power Consumption- Overall 
The low power consumption shows that these Countermeasures are effective 
















Figure 5.10: Spoof Attack CPU Power Consumption 
Similar to Radio power consumption levels in Fig 5.6/5.7 CPU power 
consumption levels reflect the same behavior with more countermeasure nodes in the 
network resulting in lower levels of power consumption. This could mean effective 



















In a spoofed attack, when the malicious node was injected, the power 
consumption of the entire sensor network increased. During countermeasure, the 
whole power consumption for the network decreased, though it was higher than 
before the attack. 
Attacks consumed 0.7% more power when compared to normal operation 
modes, and the power consumed by countermeasures was 0.2% more than normal 
values. The difference between the two shows the impact of the two operations, 




































Figure 5.13: Spoof Countermeasure Overall Power Consumption 
In the graph in fig 5.12 and 5.13 we have the total power consumption levels of CPU 
and radio from 10 motes. Maximum power levels are noticed in 70:30 (Attack: 
Countermeasure) configurations with power levels going down as the proportion of 
countermeasure nodes are increased from 70:30 ( 7 Counter nodes and 3 bad nodes)  
to 10:90 (1 counter node and 9 bad nodes) . Hence countermeasures are effective 
against the spoof attack. 
5.2 Selective forwarding attack and countermeasure 
 
5.2.1 Action and result 
Attack 
- Action: The malicious mote will only forward received messages from whose 
address is an even number. For example, messages from motes whose 
addresses are 2, 4, 6, 8...will be forwarded, and messages from 1, 3, 5, and 
7...will be dropped. 
- Result: Data loss, longer path to reach destination. 
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- Action: Two-path routing.  
- Result: Each node will send same message twice. 














 Initialize: Comm,TimerC,LEdC 
 Get Communication and timer Parameters 
 
 Make a neighbor list from nearby motes 
  
 Input: Ready to receive message from other motes 
 Compute: Drop messages from motes 1,3,5,7 …….; 
 Output: Retransmit only messages from motes 2, 4, 6, 8……. 
  
 Show output on Led: Green On -Sending Message; Green off - Send done.  




 Initialize: Comm,TimerC,LEdC 
 Get Communication and timer Parameters 
 
 Input: when a message is received from any mote 
 Compute: Choose two parents from the neighbor list 
 Output: Retransmit to both motes on the network. 
 
 Show output on Led:  
    Green on:      sending message to main parent; 
    Green off:     send done; 
    Yellow on:     sending message to another parent; 





Same as the Network composition in Figure 4.2 
5.2.3 Selective forwarding attack details 
This attack application is modified from multi-hop router program [13].  
In the RouterM.nc program, when a message is received, if the destination 
address in message is equal or part of the local address, then it must be forwarded. In 





5.2.4 Countermeasure on selective forwarding 
To avoid data loss caused by selective forwarding, when sending a message, 
we can choose two different paths. In section Error! Reference source not found., 
we discussed the parent choosing mechanism for routing. For the countermeasure we 
modify the routing approach by having two different parent nodes. If one route is 




    if (pMsg->addr == TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS) { // Addressed to local node 
      if ((signal Intercept.intercept[id](pMsg,&pMHMsg->data[0],PayloadLen)) == SUCCESS) { 
        if (pMHMsg->originaddr % 2 == 0) 
          pMsg = mForward(pMsg,id); 
        else 
          dbg(DBG_ROUTE, "MHop: message from 0x%x dropped\n", pMHMsg->originaddr); 
      } 











Figure 5.14: Choose another parent – Selective Forwarding. 
In figure 5, suppose node “A” wants to send a message to the base station and 
node B, C, and D are neighbors of A. A has a parent B. We must choose another good 
parent in C and D. We can take this topology as a tree with the base station as root. 
The depth (hop count) of C is 1 and D is 2, we think C is better than D because C is 
nearer to the root than D. Hence we choose node C as A’s other parent and send a 
message copy to it. Since we transmit the message in two different paths we achieve 
redundancy. 
5.2.5 Simulation / Power Analysis - Selective forward attack 
5.2.5.1 Before attack 
    Let 10 nodes run “Surge.od” for 10 minutes this time. Following is the data 
on nodes 0, 5, 9. (Unit is Joule) 
Node CPU Led Radio Sensor 
Board 
Flash Total 
0 6.439 0.000 17.283 1.26 0.004 24.986 
5 6.419 0.000 17.322 1.26 0.004 25.005 
9 6.418 0.000 17.322 1.26 0.004 25.004 
Table 5.2: Typical Power consumption with Surge – Normal Operation 
 
5.2.5.2 After attack 
A normal node becomes a malicious node (node 9, run SForwardAttack.od), 
and run again. (Run 10 minutes, unit is) 
Node CPU Led Radio Sensor Flash Total 
A
B C (hop count is 1) 




0 6.437 0.000 17.283 1.26 0.004 24.984 
5 6.420 0.000 17.324 1.26 0.004 25.008 
9 6.418 0.328 17.315 1.26 0.004 25.325 
 
Table 5.2.1: Selective forward attack Power consumption 
5.2.5.3 During counter 
Change Surge (Normal) to SForwardCounter.od, and run again. (Run 10 
minutes, unit is Joule) 
Node CPU Led Radio Sensor 
Board 
Flash Total 
0 6.475 0.000 17.283 1.26 0.004 25.022 
5 6.440 0.000 17.358 1.26 0.004 25.062 
9 6.431 0.408 17.315 1.26 0.004 25.418 




Figure 5.15: Program Execution sequence. Surge.od – Normal,  
SForwardAttack.od - Attack, SForwardCounter.od – Countermeasures 
 
5.2.5.4 Only radio power consumption comparison 
Now we just compare radio power consumption before attack, after attack and 
during counter: (unit is Joule) 
Node Before After During 
0 17.28294848432617 17.28294848432617 17.282948317333982
1 17.314971744116207 17.314978269824216 17.346994830200195
2 17.314971744116207 17.314971744116207 17.346994830200195
Normal Mode 
10 Motes 















3 17.314971744116207 17.314971744824216 17.346999180200193
4 17.314971744116207 17.31497826911621 17.375057510815427
5 17.322473176147458 17.32375404020996 17.35727654270019 
6 17.314971744116207 17.314971744116207 17.346999180200193
7 17.314971744116207 17.318082028100584 17.34870844895019 
8 17.31497826911621 17.315721452319334 17.346994830200195
9 17.31497826911621 17.31497163474121 17.31497163474121 
Total 173.12520866340329 173.130349411694314 173.41394530554197
 
Table 5.2.3: Selective forward Average Radio Power consumption 
 
From section 4.6.8 
Power increase rate 1 = (After – Before)/before = 2.9693817155298516704e-5 





















Figure 5.16: Selective forward Radio Power Consumption 
The Base station (node 0) does not show any increase in power consumption 
levels.  The base station receives messages only from the border motes, and therefore 
it does not have a role in the selective forwarding attack or the countermeasure. 
Increase in countermeasure power consumption is noticed in all the nodes because 
most of them retransmit the message they receive in two paths to achieve redundancy 




















Figure 5.17: Selective forward Radio Power Consumption - Overall 
Countermeasure results show more power consumption due to redundant 
messages being generated in different paths simultaneously resulting in increased 
traffic. 















Figure 5.18: Selective forward Attack Radio Power Consumption  
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Figure 5.19: Selective forward Countermeasure Radio Power Consumption 
 
 
5.2.5.5 Only CPU power consumption comparison 
Node Before After During 
0 6.436892733870361 6.437137944034423 6.4745700777771 
1 6.417669621845215 6.417784338985352 6.4373625115061035
2 6.417714777305175 6.417729432723145 6.437382373996827 
3 6.4179184683676755 6.417910607921874 6.4374748089899905
4 6.417709932837158 6.417771974335694 6.442518032521241 
5 6.419206613960204 6.419599966203369 6.439364050125 
6 6.417693816689209 6.417890334708252 6.437257338947509 
7 6.41787958201709 6.418542258498535 6.437660701487305 
8 6.417750651114991 6.417954426384277 6.437547921103272 
9 6.41788059078003 6.417910599329345 6.430664973464844 
Total 64.1983167887871085 64.200231883124266 64.411802789919192
 
Table 5.2.4: Selective forward Attack Average CUP Power consumption 
 
From section 4.6.8 
Power increase rate 1 = (After – Before)/before = 2.9830911976371174568e-5 



















Figure 5.20: Selective forward CPU Power Consumption 
 
Increased countermeasure is a result of transmitting packets in two paths as 







































Figure 5.22: Selective forward Attack CPU Power Consumption 
 
 
















Figure 5.23: Selective forward Countermeasure CPU Power Consumption 
5.2.5.6 Conclusion 
In the selective forwarding attack, the power consumption loss is small. 
However the sensors consume more power to counter this attack. This attack results in 
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loss of data and there is little or no power consumption spike due to lost data. 
However, power readings are more when countermeasures are being applied to avoid 
this loss. 
This attack did not affect power consumption much; a difference of 0.0002% 
from normal running mode does not indicate any significant change. However the 
data loss is damaging for this attack. The countermeasures applied consumed almost 
0.3 % more than the normal operating modes; this was significantly higher than the 
attack power levels. This cost is only because of the attempt to retransmit the same 
data. 
 





















Figure 5.24: Selective forward Attacks Power Consumption – Overall 
In the graph in fig.5.24, the maximum power consumption level is noticed at 



























Figure 5.25: Selective forward Countermeasure Power Consumption - Overall 
 
In the above graph fig 5.25 the proportion of nodes providing countermeasures 
at 90% (9 Counter Nodes) consumes more power than a smaller number. This is due 
to the fact that the data is actually dropped and not forwarded in the 10% (1 Counter 
node and 9 Attack nodes) configuration, with the defending nodes having to defend 
the network and actually relay back messages on two routes. In this type of attack, 
countermeasures are not very effective and cause more damage when they are 
deployed in large numbers. 
 
 
5.3 Sinkhole attack and countermeasure 




Sinkhole Attacks aim at causing data loss by dropping packets and not 
forwarding any message. The also deceive motes in their proximity into thinking that 
the base station is nearer than the normal path. 




The Attacks can be solved by using a two path routing strategy and also 








 Initialize: Comm,TimerC,LEdC 
 Get Communication and timer Parameters 
 
 Make a neighbor list from nearby motes 
  
 Input: Ready to receive message from other motes 
 Compute: Drop all packets 
Output: Increase Message send success rate to base station.  
  
 Show output on Led: 
    Green on:      sending message; 
    Green off:     send done; 
 




5.3.2 Network composition 
Same as the Network composition in Figure 4.2 
5.3.3 Sinkhole attack details 
Sinkhole attack is similar to selective forwarding attack. When a malicious 







    if (pMsg->addr == TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS) { // Addressed to local node 
      if ((signal Intercept.intercept[id](pMsg,&pMHMsg->data[0],PayloadLen)) == 
SUCCESS) { 
        // Do nothing 
        dbg(DBG_ROUTE, "MHop: message from 0x%x dropped\n", pMHMsg->originaddr); 




 Initialize: Comm,TimerC,LEdC 
 Get Communication and timer Parameters 
 
 Input: when a message is received from any mote 
 Compute: Choose two parents from the neighbor list 
 Output: Retransmit to both motes on the network. Also retransmit same message twice. 
 
 Show output on Led:  
    Green on:      sending message to main parent; 
    Green off:     send done; 
    Yellow on:     sending message to another parent; 





Same as countermeasure on selective forwarding as outlined in section 5.2.4. 
Redundancy is achieved by retransmission of data and taking a two path route to 
reach the destination. The overheads achieved, would be similar to that of Selective 
forwarding. 
 
5.3.5 Simulation / Power Analysis - Sinkhole attack 
5.3.5.1 Before attack 
    Let 10 nodes run “Surge.od” (Normal) for 10 minutes. The same setup as in 
Selective forwarding attacks as in 5.2.5.  
5.3.5.2 After attack 
SinkholeAttack.od – program to simulate an Attack. 
A normal node is changed to a malicious node (node 9, run SinkholeAttack.od), and 
run the same setup again. (Run 10 minutes, unit is Joule). We simulate an attack by 
running the SinkholeAttack program simultaneously in 9 motes.  The simulations 
show dropped packets and increase in transmitting traffic from some motes. 
 
Node CPU Led Radio Sensor 
Board 
Flash Total 
0 6.438 0.000 17.283 1.26 0.004 24.985 
5 6.418 0.000 17.315 1.26 0.004 24.997 
9 6.418 0.174 17.316 1.26 0.004 25.172 
 
Table 5.3: Sinkhole Attack Power consumption 
5.3.5.3 During counter 
SinkholeCounter.od – program to simulate a Countermeasure. 




Node CPU Led Radio Sensor 
Board 
Flash Total 
0 6.478 0.012 17.283 1.26 0.004 25.037 
5 6.436 0.344 17.348 1.26 0.004 25.392 
9 6.429 0.196 17.316 1.26 0.004 25.205 
 





Figure 5.26: Program Execution sequence. Surge – Normal, 
SinkholeAttack - Attack, SinkholeCounter – Countermeasures 
 
5.3.5.4 Only radio power consumption comparison 
Node Before After During 
0 17.28294848432617 17.28294848432617 17.282948317333982 
1 17.314971744116207 17.31497826911621 17.346994830200195 
2 17.314971744116207 17.314971744116207 17.346994830200195 
3 17.314971744116207 17.314971744116207 17.346997005200194 
4 17.314971744116207 17.314971744116207 17.353635102856444 
5 17.322473176147458 17.314978270532226 17.34763743723144 
6 17.314971744116207 17.31668536286621 17.347423234887696 
7 17.314971744116207 17.314971744116207 17.346994830200195 
8 17.31497826911621 17.314971744116207 17.346994830200195 
9 17.31497826911621 17.31582844411621 17.31582844411621 
Total 173.12520866340329 173.120277551538061 173.382448862426746
 




















From section 4.6.8 
Power increase rate 1 = (After – Before)/before = -2.848292229247941548e-5 


















Figure 5.27: Sinkhole Radio Power Consumption 
 
Since packets are dropped no effect is seen due to the attacks power 
consumption readings; however, a huge spike is noticed in the countermeasure 


























































Figure 5.30: Sinkhole Attack Countermeasure Power Consumption  
5.3.5.5  Only CPU power consumption comparison 
Node Before After During 
0 6.436892733870361 6.438104976496094 6.476776941757569
1 6.417669621845215 6.41796414969043 6.436301674402099
2 6.417714777305175 6.417907878934571 6.436459079227783
3 6.4179184683676755 6.418143987891601 6.436361210319092
4 6.417709932837158 6.417974214979249 6.437570359634277
5 6.419206613960204 6.418074903956055 6.43648570060205 
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6 6.417693816689209 6.4183431231950685 6.436419373149903
7 6.41787958201709 6.418045924791747 6.436295817734131
8 6.417750651114991 6.418063756008545 6.436592150010498
9 6.41788059078003 6.417884335404297 6.429456523581543
Total 64.19831679 64.20050725 64.39871883 
 
Table 5.3.3: Sinkhole CPU Power consumption 
 
From section 4.6.8 
Power increase rate 1 = (After – Before)/before = 3.4120209213042826881e-5 


























































Figure 5.33: Sinkhole Attacks CPU Power Consumption 
 
In the graph in Fig 5.33, 50% (5 Attack and 5 Normal) of the nodes being 
Attack configuration consume more power than the others. The graph below indicates 



















Figure 5.34: Sinkhole Countermeasure CPU Power Consumption 
 
CPU power consumption is expensive during countermeasures. The attacks 
configuration shows maximum power expenditure during the 70% and 50% mode 
where 7 and 5 motes are malicious respectively. 
5.3.5.6 Conclusion 
In sinkhole attack, the power consumption of the sensor network is similar to 
selective forward attack. We notice a spike in the power consumption readings when 
the countermeasures are applied. This is because of the increased traffic due to 


























Figure 5.35: Sinkhole Attacks Power Consumption- Overall 























Figure 5.36: Sinkhole Countermeasure Power Consumption- Overall 
 
 
In the sinkhole attack the countermeasures applied are expensive when 
compared to the attacks themselves. Fig 5.36 shows that at 10%; Counter motes 
consumes less power compared to a 90:10 (Counter: Attack) configuration. Graph in 
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Fig 5.32 also supports this theory as we can see Counter motes consume more power 













5.4 Sybil attack and countermeasure 
5.4.1 Action and result 
Attack 
A malicious mote assumes the identity of an existing mote on the network. 
This causes confusion on the network and loss of data. 
Countermeasure 
This problem could be solved by authenticating the packets in the link layer. 
Normal motes would not receive messages from a mote whose mote-key is different. 
Malicious mote does not have the mote-key. 




5.4.2 Network composition 
Same as the Network composition in Figure 4.2 
5.4.3 Sybil attack and counter details 
Both Sybil attack and counter program are secure versions of application 
"Surge" which is used to simulate a normal multi-hop network. Authentication and 
encryption mechanism have been provided by TinyOS. In the Surge application, we 
need to change "GenericCommPromiscuous" component to "SecureGenericComm", 
and when installing the above components on a mote, we need to specify a mote-key 
(Mote-key is a unique identifier for each mote). [7]. GenericCommPromiscuius and 
SecureGenericComm are the Interfaces needed for sending and receiving messages. 
The Generic version does not carry out Encryption/Decryption. 
For attacker, when we load the program, we use an address that a normal mote 
has used. Thus in network, there are two motes whose address is the same. 
However we use a different mote-key: 
Attacker 6D524D67F24F178B0A69933FDD6C6F7F 
Initialize: Comm,TimerC,LEdC 
 Get Communication and timer Parameters 
Include TinySec component for Secure transmit ion. 
Generate mote key 
 Make a neighbor list from nearby motes 
  
 Input: Ready to receive message from other motes 
 Compute: Check mote key for each packet received. 
     
Output: Retransmit messages only if they have a valid mote key.  
  Show output on Led: 
    Green on:      sending message; 





For counter, when we load the program, we give each mote a unique address. 
All the motes have the same mote-key: 
Default  6D524D67F24F178B0A69933FDD6C6F7E 
5.4.4 Simulation / Power Analysis of Sybil Attack with Encryption / 
Decryption:- 
The simulator cannot model the Sybil attack where a node takes 2 addresses. 
We instead measure the overhead involved in encrypting/ decryption information on a 
mote. Encryption/Decryption could avoid Sybil attacks by authenticating packets in 
the link layer. 
By default, TinySec will authenticate all messages, but encryption is turned 
off. TinySec allows the user dynamically to alter the combination of security 
mechanisms for the application with the TinySecMode interface. The “AUTH” mode 
would check for the CRC, and Encrypt/Decrypt would alter the contents of the 




Let 10 nodes run SybilAttack.od for 10 minutes, and we note the power 
consumption of CPU and Radio. Next 10 nodes run Surge.od.  
Node CPU Radio Total (CPU+Radio)
0 6.596606413420167 17.31140640288086 23.90801282 
1 6.577923743991699 17.31336554460449 23.89128929 
2 6.576597169171142 17.310418992700193 23.88701616 
3 6.576780789803711 17.311841223242187 23.88862201 
4 6.5762329404467765 17.310556632202143 23.88678957 
5 6.576346703816162 17.310786741162108 23.88713344 
6 6.5775006151975095 17.31308867314453 23.89058929 
7 6.576381706343506 17.31047837890625 23.88686009 
8 6.577122562812011 17.31144219033203 23.88856475 
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9 6.575540114498535 17.31033415344238 23.88587427 
Total 65.78703276 173.1137189 238.90075166 
Table 5.4: Sybil Attack Average Radio Power Consumption 
 
Node CPU Radio Total (CPU+Radio)
0 6.436892733870361 17.28294848432617 23.71984122 
1 6.417669621845215 17.314971744116207 23.73264137 
2 6.417714777305175 17.314971744116207 23.73268652 
3 6.4179184683676755 17.314971744116207 23.73289021 
4 6.417709932837158 17.314971744116207 23.73268168 
5 6.419206613960204 17.322473176147458 23.74167979 
6 6.417693816689209 17.314971744116207 23.73266556 
7 6.41787958201709 17.314971744116207 23.73285133 
8 6.417750651114991 17.31497826911621 23.73272892 
9 6.41788059078003 17.31497826911621 23.73285886 
Total 64.19831679 173.1252087 237.32352549 





















Figure 5.37: Sybil Attack Power Consumption – Overall 
With Authentication but without Encryption/Decryption 
 
From the above chart, we can see that here, to authenticate a message (without 
encryption and decryption); about 0.15 Joule of extra powers will be consumed on 
each node. 
If encryption/decryption is implemented on the data, the data obtained from 
the corresponding program SybilAuthEncrypt.od(Encryption) for 10 minutes would 
 77 
 




Node CPU Radio Total (CPU+Radio)
0 6.65703823563501 17.310620923217773 23.96765916 
1 6.648699144708251 17.32343519123535 23.97213434 
2 6.649376978411377 17.32364078818359 23.97301777 
3 6.6491497438186045 17.323546895678707 23.97269664 
4 6.650206918786621 17.325626301049805 23.97583322 
5 6.648507362891358 17.32324591301269 23.97175328 
6 6.648886167982421 17.324282210668944 23.97316838 
7 6.6487612824431155 17.323407421313476 23.9721687 
8 6.6508710611535635 17.3270611652832 23.97793223 
9 6.649017910360107 17.323569971606446 23.97258788 
Total 66.50051481 173.2284368 239.72895161 




















Auth only Auth & Encrypt
 
Figure 5.38: Sybil Attack Power Consumption – Overall with 
Authentication – Encryption / Decryption 
5.4.4.1 Conclusion: 
About 0.09 Joule of extra powers is being consumed on encryption and 
decryption on each node with Authentication. Hence we can determine that the power 
consumption is normally greater in our proposed countermeasure. Real world 
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5.5 Hello attack and countermeasure 
5.5.1 Action and result 
Attack 
- Action: The malicious mote sends messages by using stronger radio power, and 
pretend to be a base station or a node near the base station by modify its hop count 
value. However, motes far from the malicious node cannot send messages back 
successfully, because their radio power is low. 
- Result: Network confusion and data loss. 







 Get Communication and timer Parameters 
 
 Make a neighbor list from nearby motes 
 Set Hop count to 1. To Simulate a Base Station 
 
 Input: Ready to receive message from other motes 
 Compute: Send message every two seconds to all motes 
Output: Retransmit to all motes on the network.  
  
 Show output on Led: 
    Green on:      sending message; 
    Green off:     send done; 
 Repeat operation 







- Action: If a node fails to get through a reply message to a particular node which 
sends the HELLO, then that node is distrusted. 










5.5.2 Network composition 
Hello Countermeasure 
 
 Initialize: Comm,TimerC,LEdC 
 Get Communication and timer Parameters 
 
 Input: when a message is received from any mote 
 Compute: If message is found to be not reaching the base station (malicious) 
    Stop sending anymore packets. 
 Output: Transmit only those packets that can reach a destination. 
 
 Show output on Led:  
    Green on:      sending message; 






Same as the Network composition in Figure 4.2 
5.5.3 Hello attack details 
The mote which runs the Hello attack program will pretend to be a mote near 
the base station (hop count is always 1) and broadcast hello messages in every 2 
seconds. 
5.5.4 Countermeasure details 
The strategy of route selecting was modified a little. If a node fails to reply to 











Figure 5.39: Failure to send message back – HELLO countermeasure 
In figure 5.35, Node B is the malicious mote that is sending Hello messages. 
Node A receives the message and takes B as its neighbor. Moreover the hop count of 
B is 1, and B appears to be a good parent of A. However B is far away from A, when 
  task void SendData()  
  { 
    HelloMsg *p = (HelloMsg *)gMsgBuffer.data; 
     
    p->sourceaddr = p->originaddr = TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS; 
    p->hopcount = 1; 
    p->seqno = gSendMsgNum; 
     
    dbg(DBG_USR1, "HelloM: Sending message from 0x%x to 0x%x.\n", p->sourceaddr, 
gMsgBuffer.addr); 
    call Leds.greenOn();       







A sends a message to B, it may be a failure and not reach B. A keeps count of as to 
how many HELLO replies have been sent out to B. After several failures, A will not 
trust B and does not send any message to B.  
5.5.5 Simulation / Power Analysis - Hello attack 
5.5.5.1 Before attack 
The Hello attack can be simulated by first running the normal Surge.od program in a 
typical setup of 9 (0 to 8) motes. We measure power consumption for even numbered 
motes. 0, 4, 8 respectively run for 10 minutes where the unit of measure is in Joules.  
 
 
    
Node CPU Led Radio Sensor 
Board 
Flash Total 
0 6.431 0.000 17.283 1.26 0.004 24.978 
4 6.416 0.000 17.315 1.26 0.004 24.995 
8 6.416 0.000 17.315 1.26 0.004 24.995 
 
Table 5.5: Typical Power consumption with Surge – 
Normal Operation Nodes 0, 4, 8 
 
5.5.5.2 After attack 
We inject a malicious node (node 9), into the network and run Program 
HelloAttack.od (Run 10 minutes, unit is Joule) .This malicious node will flood the 
network with a HELLO messages thus starting a chain reaction throughout the 
network. 
 





0 6.465 0.000 17.283 1.26 0.004 25.012 
4 6.447 0.000 17.315 1.26 0.004 25.026 
8 6.447 0.000 17.315 1.26 0.004 25.026 
9 6.519 4.467 17.870 1.26 0.004 30.12 
 
Table 5.5.1: HELLO Attack Power consumption 
5.5.5.3 During counter measures 
In the Hello countermeasure, every node will maintain a list called a “neighbor list” to 
record information of its neighbor nodes. If the node finds that one of its neighbor 
fails by sending messages above a set limit at one time then this node is eliminated 
from the list or distrusted, and we do not send any more messages to it.  
 
Change Surge.od to HelloCounter.od, and run again. (Run 10 minutes, unit is Joule) 
 
Node CPU Led Radio Sensor 
Board 
Flash Total 
0 6.465 0.000 17.283 1.26 0.004 25.012 
4 6.447 0.000 17.315 1.26 0.004 25.026 
8 6.447 0.000 17.315 1.26 0.004 25.026 
9 6.519 4.705 17.867 1.26 0.004 30.355 
 
Table 5.5.2: HELLO countermeasure Power consumption 
 
 
Figure 5.40: Program Execution sequence. Surge – Normal, 




















5.5.5.4 Only radio power consumption comparison 
Now we compare radio power consumption before attack, after attack and 
during counter: (unit is Joule) 
Node Before After During 
0 17.28294848432617 17.28294848432617 17.28294778046875 
1 17.314971744116207 17.31989839802246 17.32471724689941 
2 17.31498044411621 17.314971744116207 17.314971040258786 
3 17.314971744824216 17.31498044411621 17.314971040258786 
4 17.314971744116207 17.31497826911621 17.314971040258786 
5 17.314971744116207 17.314971744116207 17.314971040258786 
6 17.314978269824216 17.316042755834957 17.32043320002441 
7 17.320433903881835 17.329430402319336 17.32300362814941 
8 17.31498261911621 17.314971744824216 17.314971040258786 




Total 155.8082107 155.823194 155.8259571 
 
Table 5.5.3: HELLO Attack Radio Average Power consumption 
From section 4.6.8 
Power increase rate 1 = (After – Before)/before = 9.6165021937447870325e-5 







































Figure 5.42: HELLO Radio Power Consumption - Overall 
In the HELLO attack radio power consumption is higher than the CPU due to 
the increase in traffic caused by the HELLO message. The base station sees very little 
traffic and only the nodes seem to be affected. This shows that the nodes are more 
vulnerable to this type of attack. 
 The reason countermeasure costs are higher is because the HELLO packet 
received from nodes which have been removed from the neighbor list for which no 

































Figure 5.44: HELLO Countermeasure Radio Power Consumption 
Fig 5.42 shows that Countermeasures consume a marginally higher power 
level than the attacks. Similarly from Figs 5.43 and 5.44 higher power levels can be 
noticed at 90:10 configuration (9 bad nodes and 1 good node) in attacks and 10:90 (1 
countermeasure node and 9 bad nodes) in Countermeasures, this is because of 
countermeasures not being entirely effective. In both cases a higher number of attack 
nodes caused more spikes in power levels than a smaller proportion. At 10:90 
(Counter: Attack) ratio, the counter attack power level was found to be lower when 
compared to a similar attack configuration of 90:10 (Attack: Normal).  
 
5.5.5.5 Only CPU power consumption comparison 
Node Before After During 
0 6.43128427829541 6.465208881431397 6.4649492134775395 
1 6.416177063417724 6.448134219654053 6.448881996545653 
2 6.416095092406739 6.446888423201415 6.446766703149903 
3 6.416248120197999 6.447075559896973 6.446752494543458 
4 6.416254074820801 6.44725894853125 6.44703907945459 
5 6.416176814234375 6.447446990879396 6.447067381527588 
6 6.416276387900878 6.447544859788085 6.448334918797851 
7 6.4173069449316404 6.450182401958985 6.448545011294677 
8 6.416049885391601 6.4471048535478515 6.446822740188965 
9  6.519386674160156 (do 6.519110843658691 (do 
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not add) not add) 
Total 57.76186866 58.04684514 58.04515954 
 
Table 5.5.4: HELLO countermeasure CPU Average Power consumption 
 
From section 4.6.8 
 
Power increase rate 1 = (After – Before)/before = 0.004933643710134082770 










































Figure 5.46: HELLO attack CPU Power Consumption - Overall 
CPU power consumption is smaller in magnitude when compared to the radio 
traffic. This is because of the small number of tasks given to a CPU in a mote when a 
HELLO attack occurs. Countermeasures power levels are smaller when compared to 





























Figure 5.48: HELLO Countermeasure CPU Power Consumption 
5.5.5.6 Conclusion 
A hello attack costs very little power to counter. The overall power consumed 
in the countermeasure is much less when compared to the other forms of attacks. 
HELLO message acknowledgment limit is set to 25 in our experiments, bringing this 
number down would still limit the power consumption further. 
The difference in power levels (Radio) is as much as 0.09% and 0.11 % on 
attacks and countermeasures. The difference between the two is not significant but the 
reason for a countermeasure being much higher is the flooding of the network with lot 
of HELLO messages. On the contrary, CPU power expenditure is lower for 






















Figure 5.49: HELLO Attack Power Consumption – Overall 

























5.6 Wormhole attack 
 
A wormhole attack can be defined as one where two motes on a network being 
far apart from each other deceive the other motes on the network into thinking that the 
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distance is shorter to reach the base station if the packets travel between them. A 
decision to take that route would result in packets being lost or getting delayed. A 
wormhole attack is difficult to detect and countermeasure. In our experiment we 
decided to use different channels to simulate an attack. For example the two motes in 
question would be on channel 17 and the rest of the motes on the network would use 
channel 22. [11] Or they could be on a different frequency, 433 and 916 MHz. 
Theoretically this setup can work on a simulator but cannot be duplicated with real 
motes. Motes work on a fixed frequency and this is a limitation of the radio that’s 
built onto them. 
Similarly for countermeasure, it is impossible to check and modify a Channel 
ID of a mote during runtime. A node can only modify its own channel ID, by using 
the functions available in the CC2420 radio stack such as “TuneManual ()”. A 
malicious node would not change its channel ID by itself in this regard. 
 
Let node 8 and node 9 transmit data at 916MHz channel, and node 0 – 7 
transmit data at 433MHz. 
 
 
Node CPU Radio Total (CPU+Radio)
0 6.5174162215937494 17.292089890568032 23.80950611 
1 6.511739680535156 17.38051706500651 23.89225675 
2 6.511564614624755 17.380540147680662 23.89210476 
3 6.511588183932617 17.380497939982096 23.89208612 
4 6.5118502423281255 17.38050924910482 23.89235949 
  To Change the channel in a mote 
 
Changes in the Make File to include 
CFLAGS += -DCC2420_DEF_CHANNEL=x 
Where x is between channel 11 and 26 
 
CFLAGS=-DCC2420_DEF_CHANNEL=22 make telos 
CFLAGS=-DCC2420 DEF CHANNEL=13 make telos
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5 6.511660555369873 17.380519677539063 23.89218023 
6 6.5118372968234866 17.380595147241213 23.89243244 
7 6.511551576320801 17.38052602746582 23.8920776 
8 6.512465730357178 17.382710398746745 23.89517613 
9 6.5143572003942865 17.408891925105795 23.92324913 
Total 65.1260313 173.7473975 238.8734288 
 
Table 5.6.1: Wormhole Power consumption (433MHz & 916MHz) – Average 
 
Node CPU Radio Total (CPU+Radio)
0 6.516963577461426 17.29209536669922 23.80905894 
1 6.51114897164209 17.380584572745768 23.89173354 
2 6.510851532647949 17.380632121752928 23.89148365 
3 6.511435345177002 17.386137372965496 23.89757272 
4 6.511041412078857 17.380480457080075 23.89152187 
5 6.511179158916017 17.380578258683265 23.89175742 
6 6.510981817732666 17.38201775579427 23.89299957 
7 6.5113287342290045 17.385510646166992 23.89683938 
8 6.511048169243897 17.380615702490235 23.89166387 
9 6.510974629222657 17.38051327855631 23.89148791 
Total 65.11695335 173.7291655 238.84611885 
 
























Figure 5.51: Wormhole Power Consumption - Comparison 
The above setup yielded constant power consumption and erratic changes not 
influenced by both the frequencies.  This is because in a real world experiment the 
two malicious motes would be far apart and working in a particular channel/frequency 
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thus deceiving the other motes into believing that they are actually closer, a shortcut 
to the base station. 
5.6.1 Conclusion: 
Wormhole attacks would consume more power with the malicious motes that 
are involved in the attack; this is because of the quantity of traffic that may propagate 
through them.  Countermeasures if devised would be effective in stopping packets 
from reaching these motes altogether, they would need to maintain a routing table and 
work on finding the actual path to the base station. It would be interesting to see the 













6. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
Research on sensor networks has been on the mainstream for the past couple 
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of years. One of the major focuses has been on the security and the quantity of power 
they consume. Relating these two fields would yield us some valuable insight on how 
they would perform in a given scenario. The different attacks defined for sensors were 
simulated with the resulting countermeasures. Some of the attacks were damaging as 
in they consumed more power than usual and some of the countermeasures applied 
were effective in curtailing the power consumed. Sometimes it may be more effective 
to quarantine the network and restrict the influence of malicious nodes, instead of 
resorting to counter measures.  
  Countermeasures were effective in stopping the attack with minimal power 
expenditure for Spoof attack, compared to selective forwarding and Sinkhole attacks, 
where the power consumed was much higher. The power consumed in spoof 
countermeasures was less than that consumed during an attack enabling the motes to 
recover with minimal loss of power. With Selective forwarding the effects were just 
the opposite with more power being consumed during countermeasures. Hello 
attack/countermeasures showed a mixed mode of power consumption, with attacks 
and countermeasures consuming the same levels. The normal operations of most of 
these motes were documented using the Surge program which showed a consistent 
power level. Though the magnitude of power difference ( E.g.: 0.1% - 0.6% for 10 
minutes) in most of our experiments is not significant enough to alter the power 
consumption of the single sensor, the study when extrapolated to a bigger network 
with larger number of motes working for longer periods of time would offer 
significant benefits. 
The decision to apply a countermeasure or not depends on the current power 
level left on the mote. It also depends on factors like the motes ability to recover from 
such an attack and provide seamless service for the rest of its operational life. Future 
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Sinkhole Spoof Selective Forward Hello
 























Sinkhole Spoof Selective Forward Hello
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Findings and Conclusions: 
 The attacks and countermeasures defined for Sensor Networks were 
designed and simulated using Avrora – a simulator and power analysis tool. 
The data gathered from this setup was analyzed and compared to find the 
best solution in defending a network. The results showed that only some of 
the countermeasures applied were economical with relation to power. Results 
showed that countermeasures for attacks such as Hello, Selective Forward 
and Sinkhole consumed more power than countermeasures to other attacks. 
This study also shows that attacks such as Hello and Spoof are more energy 
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